Coyote Blog

This year has been a frustrating year for my business.  As many of you know, I am in the business of privatizing public recreation.  We take over the management of public recreation facilities, and are generally able to run them to the same or better standards as the government for less money.  Whereas before we take over, the government typically loses money on a park, we often can run it at a profit AND pay the government rent for the concession rights.

This year, numerous state parks have been threatened with closure in states all across the country.  In many of these states, I have communicated with everyone I could think of, from the governor to state parks leaders, trying to say that companies like ours could probably keep many of these parks open. I told them I wasn't looking for a sweetheart deal - we weren't afraid to bid against other companies, but it was crazy to close parks that could easily remain open.   We have been told any number of times by numerous state leaders that they would prefer to close the park rather than put it under private concession management.

To some extent, this is due to the pressure of public employees unions, who have every incentive to play brinkmanship and force closure of parks rather than set the precedent of having them managed by a non-union private company.  This is unsurprising.

I also understand that there is a fear of private management of public recreation facilities.  I swear the first think I hear almost every time I present on what we do  is that they fear we would put a billboard or a McDonalds in front of Old Faithful.  I kid you not, this charge is as regular as clockwork.  Fortunately, we manage about 175 public recreation facilities to a pretty high standard, and not one billboard or McDonalds can be found at any of them.  A large part of the bid process for any facility management contract is not just the rate or the rent but also the detailed operating standards to which it will be managed.  So this is a normal, but surmountable hurdle.

But even taking into account these usual sources of resistance, I am always just amazed at how vociferous the opposition is to even experimenting with private management.  States like California are simply hell-bent on closing parks a company like ours could easily keep open for the public (to be fair, Ruth Coleman, head of California State Parks, is very open to new models but she gets absolutely no support either within her organization or in the legislature for such new ideas).

But I think I understand this phenomenon better now after reading Kevin Drum today. This is what Drum wrote in response to the DNC ad, which clearly stretched the truth, claiming that Republicans voted to end Medicare:

Why not just tell the truth: Republicans essentially voted in favor of turning Medicare over to private industry.  With only a few words of explanation, this could easily be more effective than the ad that actually ran.  Like so:

Republicans voted to turn Medicare over to private insurance companies!  You heard right: they want to hand Medicare over to the same companies that [insert two or three insurance company outrages here, maybe a Wall Street reference, something about profits over people, etc.].  Democrats will never do that.  Blah blah blah.

Would that really be any less scary than the ad that actually ran?

So for Drum, and I presume for much of the Left, the suggestion that a government service be managed privately is just as bad as the suggestion that the service be ended. In essence, Drum is saying he would almost rather have no Medicare than Medicare provided privately.

It certainly explains a lot, and puts the phenomenon I see in public recreation into a larger context.

Update: A couple of the comments hpothesize the problem is that many in government and on the left just hate profits and the profit motive in general.  One related story -- I was in a meeting with a large state parks organization where a senior person raised the idea of private park management.  Well, everyone hated the idea, but when it looked as if the leadership might still seriously consider the private option, one person in the room said "well could we at least mandate that they can't make a profit."  There was a lot of head nodding at this.

I didn't go off on this and kept a smile on my face.  But I did lose it in an earlier meeting with the head of some government parks we actually did run.  We were discussing park fee increases for the next year (the state had just raised minimum wages about 30% and we were scrambling to make ends meet).  He said he was uncomfortable with the level of profits we made.  I asked him, "Jim (not his real name) does this state pay you more than $25,000 a year to run this park?"  He nodded.  I said, "then you make more profit in this park than I do, and what is more, you didn't have to invest $100,000 in equipment to get your job, nor do you have to rebid for your job every 5 years, nor does you salary go down if for some reason park visitation decreases."

Sometimes I wish I had stood up in that state meeting and said something similar, as in "Why is the money I make in a park somehow tainted because it is the difference between my revenues and expenses and the result of substantial investments and subject to extraordinary risks, while the virtually guaranteed-for-life salary you make, paid for by the same visitors, is somehow pristine?"

Two excerpts from Obama's speech:

That's why under my plan, individuals will be required to carry basic health insurance "“ just as most states require you to carry auto insurance.

Oh, jeez, I sure wish that were true.  Auto insurance covers only catastrophic damages, such as totaling your car or incurring serious liability by hurting someone.   It does not cover regular repairs, preventative maintenance, etc.  Also, state-mandated auto insurance has a range of coverage caps -- if you want a higher cap, you can pay for it.  No one expects their company to pay their auto insurance, and if a company were to provide it it would be considered a taxable benefit.  Compared to our current health insurance system, auto insurance-like health insurance would be a brilliant improvement.  Despite his making this analogy, this is absolutely NOT what he is suggesting.  Also from his speech:

Under this plan, it will be against the law for insurance companies to deny you coverage because of a pre-existing condition. As soon as I sign this bill, it will be against the law for insurance companies to drop your coverage when you get sick or water it down when you need it most. They will no longer be able to place some arbitrary cap on the amount of coverage you can receive in a given year or a lifetime. We will place a limit on how much you can be charged for out-of-pocket expenses, because in the United States of America, no one should go broke because they get sick. And insurance companies will be required to cover, with no extra charge, routine checkups and preventive care, like mammograms and colonoscopies

Update: OK, here is another good pairing, from the same source -- first, he says that a public option will not be subsidized:

They argue that these private companies can't fairly compete with the government. And they'd be right if taxpayers were subsidizing this public insurance option. But they won't be. I have insisted that like any private insurance company, the public insurance option would have to be self-sufficient and rely on the premiums it collects.

But then he makes this comparison:

It would also keep pressure on private insurers to keep their policies affordable and treat their customers better, the same way public colleges and universities provide additional choice and competition to students without in any way inhibiting a vibrant system of private colleges and universities.

See?  The public option will not be subsidized and will work just like public universities which are highly subsidized.

By the way, it is almost impossible for government NOT to subsidize such an entity, in part because of the way government accounting differs from private accounting.  Government accounting is on a cash basis, so large up front investments show as a first year loss with no future expense implications.  In operation, it means capital spending is pretty much free.  And numerous charges that private firms take on, such as liability insurance, are not charged for on government books.   I compete with the government a lot, and have investigated this dynamic in depth.  Even why my costs are lower, the government, because of the way it accounts for things, often thinks its costs are much lower than mine and they under-price us.

I have seen several folks of late testing out a meme that opposition to health care reform is mostly about churlish unwillingness to help people.  My sense is that this is dead wrong.

As a strong libertarian, that may well be my motivation.  But the vast majority of Americans accept and support the government safety net and generally will support reasonable expansions of it to address true need.   I think most Americans would be willing to help people who honestly need financial aid to pay the health care bills.  This is particularly true for children -- you don't remember people going ballistic over SCHIP, do you?

I am not representative.  The vast center of this country is willing to accept, even embrace, increased government interventions in the right cause.  I forgot to blog on it, but remember that poll a few weeks ago that a majority of Americans think the government should required that women take their husbands last name after marriage?  I think the notion that there is any kind of sizable block of small government libertarian type folks out there is simply a myth.

So health care intervention and spending can be sold - again remember SCHIP but also the prescription drug bill.  I think the Administration is having trouble selling it in this case for two reasons:

• They are having difficulty showing people who truly are not getting care.  Sure there are a lot of people who are uninsured, but I think that meme has been around enough for people to deconstruct.  Who isn't getting care?   Sure, for some folks getting care is a real hassle, but there are arguments to be made that accepting charity should not be that easy (remember the old Welfare?)  And sure, some folks have financial straights and can even face bankruptcy over health care bills, but our bankruptcy laws are incredibly generous and when tens of thousands are facing bankruptcy because they bought too many TV's on their credit cards, it almost seems honorable to face bankruptcy over your wife's cancer treatment.
• The second problem is what I call the public housing problem.  In the late 1960s, Americans were concerned about the poor and homeless and spent billions to build housing projects for them.  It turns out that this doesn't work out so well, but that is not my point.  My point is that Americans could be convinced to spend money to build poor people government homes.  BUT their position would have been very different if investments in public housing required the rich and middle class who were paying for the program to move out of their homes and into public housing as well.That is the fear that I think much of America has today.  If asked, they would likely pay to provide government health care in an instance where it was demonstrated that health care was entirely lacking.  They would likely suspect that such care, like much of public housing, would suck, but as it was being offered to someone who supposedly had nothing, it would represent a net improvement.  But they don't want to move into the projects themselves, and frankly don't understand why agreeing to help poor people afford more health care also means they have to move into the government system themselves.

I just finished "The Box," which is a history of container shipping.  Never has any book I have read elicited so many laughs from my family.  Nothing says "geek" like reading a book about shipping containers.

But, for those of you who might similarly be turned off by the subject matter as unpromising, I can say this is easily one of the most interesting business books I have ever read.    It is fascinating to see how the entire economics of an industry can be changed not by some arcane advance in silicon, but by a metal box.  In a period of about 20 years, the entire merchandise shipping business, which had remained virtually unchanged for thousands of years, was completely reinvented.  Every ship and every port had to be replaced.  Moreover, these changes resonated far beyond shipping, as they enabled much of the global manufacturing revolution of the last generation.

Because pre-container shipping and transport were so highly regulated, the book provides a great window on how regulation affects innovation, and vice versa.  It also focuses quite a bit on how unions and in particular union work rules affected industry economics, and how these unions reacted to change in the industry.

And of course, the book allows us to look at any number of interesting business strategy issues:

• Is being a first mover an advantage, or a disadvantage?  Sea-Land reaped a number of first mover advantages, but it also got hurt badly when a number of the earlier investment choices they made turned out to be wrong.  Several late movers, who invested after ship designs had been through two or three generations, did quite well.  Others did not.
• Who makes money investing into this kind of change?  A few early SeaLand investors made out well, the equivalent of angel investors, but later investors did poorly.  And it is not at all clear that anyone making massive, billion dollar investments ever really made great returns.  Like the airline industry, the industry quickly hit over-capacity and prices dropped.  It is clear shippers won big, but did it really make sense for anyone to invest in this business?  The best strategy I can come up with was followed by Maersk, which basically sat out until late and then bought up assets on the cheap out of bankruptcy from early participants.

This situation was reminiscent of a business case I had at HBS about the beginnings of the high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) market.  It was run as a computer simulation among teams.  Basically, almost not matter what everyone did, the industry ended up in over-capacity and everyone lost money.  The only successful strategy was the Wargames approach ("the only winning move is not to play').

I don't generally give investment advice, because I am not really qualified to do so and I make enough mistakes with my own investments that it seems silly to give other people advice.

But these are extraordinary times, and I do want to pass on one general piece of advice: Be ready for inflation.  If you are under forty, you probably don't even remember any real inflation, so you may need to seek advice as to how to handle it.

I just do not see how there is going to be any way to avoid a substantial uptick in inflation over the next couple of years. Crazy-large deficit spending, huge inflation of the money supply, absurdly low interest rates, massive government money-printing efforts, and government-mandated tilts in the balance of power between labor and management towards the unions can only add up to inflation,

Now, if we were really in the next Great Depression, as the Obama administration tried to tell us in its early weeks (mainly in order to pass pet legislation in a mood of total panic), then we might not see much immediate inflationary pressure. But I think most of us are realizing that the whole depression thing was over-sold. We are likely already on the first steps towards a recovery (if the Administration does not keep doing stupid stuff to kill it) and this recovery will become obvious by the third quarter (for their budget, the Obama administration is forecasting this now to be a milder-than-average recession). When the recovery starts, inflation is going to slam home hard and fast.

The smart money already knows this. That is why the government (as is the UK government) is having a hard time finding takers for long-term government bonds fixed at 4 or 5 percent. Such low rates could easily be under water after inflation.

So, find ways to hedge inflation.  Here are some general ideas:

• If you need to borrow money, now is a great time if you can borrow long and fixed (as with 30-year mortgages).  With high inflation, the amount you owe effectively goes down every year.  Borrowers love inflation!
• Avoid buying long-term bonds at fixed rates like the plague.  Again, you want to be issuing such bonds, not buying them.
• Consider various US government inflation-adjusted bonds, or shorter maturities on traditional bonds
• Equities tend to be a good inflation hedge.  Revenues and earnings go up with inflation, so equity prices and dividends tend to as well.  There will be, though, certain industries and companies that will not manage well in this environment.
• Gold is OK, but I have always thought of gold as dead value.  Sure, it can hedge inflation, but it gives no real return.  Commodity producer stocks (e.g. oil companies) may be a better bet.
• International stocks are really dicey in this kind of environment.  Added to the underlying risk of investing in less developed markets is the currency question, which basically boils down to -- we know the US is screwing up its currency, but will other countries screw theirs up worse?  If you think there is a country out there who is less likely to inflate their currency, by all means consider equities and bonds denominated in that currency.  You get the underlying return plus an exchange rate boost   (all things being equal, if the US has a lot of inflation and others don't, the value of the dollar will fall.  Thus investment returns in, say, Euros will return more dollars in the future.)

These are just some ideas, and I am not positive they are all good ones.  Talk to someone more knowledgeable than me, but whatever you do, I think you need to be planning for inflation.

This is taken from and expanded from the end of this post.

Everyone involved in the bailout plan says, at least publicly, that they are not trying to bail out a bunch of Wall Street folks who lived high off the risk premium of these investments but now want to avoid the costs when the actual risks become clear.  They claim to be bailing out Wall Street and various large banks because they fear that a financial meltdown and liquidity crisis will starve main street businesses of cash, and create a deep economic slowdown.

OK, if this is the real policy goal -- to maintain the ability of main street businesses to borrow -- then here is my alternative proposal:

1. Immediately increase the SBA loan gaurantee authority by $100 billion dollars.  That is enough for a million new small business loans of $100,000 each.
2. Authorize treasury to spend up to X hundred billion to buy rated new issues of bonds and commercial paper of US non-financial companies.  Some limits should be applied - such as the feds cannot buy any more than 30% of a single issue and/or more than 10% of the entire outstanding debt of one company.

That's the plan.  Here are the advantages:

• The government is addressing the actual policy goal of keeping liquidity in main street business directly
• The government is investing in success, in main street companies trying to grow, and not in failed banks and financial institutions
• Moral hazard issues are avoided with financial institutions. 
• The SBA loan guarantees cost nothing today.  In fact, they are cash positive in the short term due to loan guarantee payments by borrowers.  Of course, they risk future losses,  but such losses in the future are in part covered by the guarantee payments, and a future loss is cheaper than a loss today.
• Investments in corporate bond issues are much easier to value, and are far less risky, than investments in illiquid mortgage securities.  The taxpayer is far less likely to take a beating on these purchases.
• Banks may still fail, but the FDIC has an infrastructure and experience for handling this.  If necessary to calm people, the FDIC could make a public commitment to assisted mergers to maintain all depositors.
• If there is some big financial meltdown, which I still doubt, there might be a need to inject some mortgage liquidity, but since the Feds now own Fannie and Freddie, the vehicle for doing so is easily available.

Update:  I was not clear -- this is actually an alternative to by alternative.  My first, preferred alternative plan is "do nothing."

Been smugly thinking that you were smart enough not to take out an interest only mortgage to finance a house at the peak of the market?  Or savvy enough not to invest your savings in a mortgage portfolio or some sort of interest rate swap?

Sorry, think again.  Because GWB and the US Congress have decided to force you to be an investor in crappy, devalued investments.  To the tune of at least $700 billion.

Four years ago, privatization of Social Security was scuttled in large part because Congress thought it unfair to toss the average taxpayer into the volatile marketplace with his/her retirement savings.  Now, the government is forcing us all to participate in the financial markets, but only allowing us to invest in the worst assets.  Just great.

Saul Hansell at the NY Times has an interesting article about why risk assessment programs in investment banks were not sounding the alarm coming into the recent turmoil.  The article contains this gem:

Ms. Rahl said that it was now clear that the computers needed to
assume extra risk in owning a newfangled security that had never been
seen before.

"New products, by definition, carry more risk," she said. The models
should penalize investments that are complex, hard to understand and
infrequently traded, she said. They didn't.

I continue to see parallels between recent problems and the meltdown at Enron.  In fact, in many ways events in the natural gas trading market were a dry run for events in the mortgage market.   One filmmaker coined the phrase "Smartest Guys in the Room" to describe the hubris of the guys who ran Enron.  To some extent the phrase was absolutely true - I knew Jeff Skilling at McKinsey and he was indeed the smartest guy in the room.  But everyone can be wrong, and sometimes the smartest guys can be spectacularly wrong as they overestimate their ability to predict and control complex events.  I think this is a fair description of what went on in Wall Street over the past several years.

I know that most non-financial folks, including myself, have their head spinning after this past few weeks' doings on Wall Street.  Doug Diamond and Anil Kashyap have a pretty good layman's roundup on Fannie/Freddie, Lehman, and AIG.  My sense is that their Lehman explanation also applies to Bear Stearns as well.  Here is just one small piece of a much longer article:

The Fannie and Freddie situation was a result of their unique roles
in the economy. They had been set up to support the housing market.
They helped guarantee mortgages (provided they met certain standards),
and were able to fund these guarantees by issuing their own debt, which
was in turn tacitly backed by the government. The government guarantees
allowed Fannie and Freddie to take on far more debt than a normal
company. In principle, they were also supposed to use the government
guarantee to reduce the mortgage cost to the homeowners, but the Fed
and others have argued that this hardly occurred. Instead, they appear to have used the funding advantage to rack up huge profits
and squeeze the private sector out of the "conforming" mortgage market.
Regardless, many firms and foreign governments considered the debt of
Fannie and Freddie as a substitute for U.S. Treasury securities and snapped it up eagerly. 

Fannie and Freddie were weakly supervised and strayed from the core
mission. They began using their subsidized financing to buy
mortgage-backed securities which were backed by pools of mortgages that
did not meet their usual standards. Over the last year, it became clear
that their thin capital was not enough to cover the losses on these subprime
mortgages. The massive amount of diffusely held debt would have caused
collapses everywhere if it was defaulted upon; so the Treasury
announced that it would explicitly guarantee the debt.

But once the debt was guaranteed to be secure (and the government
would wipe out shareholders if it carried through with the guarantee),
no self-interested investor was willing to supply more equity to help
buffer the losses. Hence, the Treasury ended up taking them over.

Lehman's demise came when it could not even keep borrowing. Lehman
was rolling over at least $100 billion a month to finance its
investments in real estate, bonds, stocks, and financial assets. When
it is hard for lenders to monitor their investments and borrowers can
rapidly change the risk on their balance sheets, lenders opt for short-term lending. Compared to legal or other channels, their threat to refuse to roll over funding is the most effective option to keep the borrower in line.

This was especially relevant for Lehman, because as an investment
bank, it could transform its risk characteristics very easily by using
derivatives and by churning its trading portfolio. So for Lehman (and
all investment banks), the short-term financing is not an accident; it
is inevitable.

Why did the financing dry up? For months, short-sellers were
convinced that Lehman's real-estate losses were bigger than it had
acknowledged. As more bad news about the real estate market emerged,
including the losses at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, this view spread.

Lehman's costs of borrowing rose and its share price fell. With an
impending downgrade to its credit rating looming, legal restrictions
were going to prevent certain firms from continuing to lend to Lehman.
Other counterparties
that might have been able to lend, even if Lehman's credit rating was
impaired, simply decided that the chance of default in the near future
was too high, partly because they feared that future credit conditions
would get even tighter and force Lehman and others to default at that
time.

A.I.G. had to raise money because it had written $57 billion of insurance contracts whose payouts depended on the losses incurred on subprime real-estate related investments.
While its core insurance businesses and other subsidiaries (such as its
large aircraft-leasing operation) were doing fine, these contracts,
called credit default swaps (C.D.S.'s), were hemorrhaging.   

Furthermore, the possibility of further losses loomed if the housing
market continued to deteriorate. The credit-rating agencies looking at
the potential losses downgraded A.I.G.'s debt on Monday. With its lower
credit ratings, A.I.G.'s insurance contracts required A.I.G. to
demonstrate that it had collateral to service the contracts; estimates
suggested that it needed roughly $15 billion in immediate collateral.

A second problem A.I.G. faced is that if it failed to post the
collateral, it would be considered to have defaulted on the C.D.S.'s.
Were A.I.G. to default on C.D.S.'s, some other A.I.G. contracts (tied
to losses on other financial securities) contain clauses saying that
its other contractual partners could insist on prepayment of their
claims. These cross-default clauses are present so that resources from
one part of the business do not get diverted to plug a hole in another
part. A.I.G. had another $380 billion of these other insurance
contracts outstanding. No private investors were willing to step into
this situation and loan A.I.G. the money it needed to post the
collateral.

In the scramble to make good on the C.D.S.'s, A.I.G.'s ability to
service its own debt would come into question. A.I.G. had $160 billion
in bonds that were held all over the world: nowhere near as widely as
the Fannie and Freddie bonds, but still dispersed widely.

In addition, other large financial firms "” including Pacific
Investment Management Company (Pimco), the largest bond-investment fund
in the world "” had guaranteed A.I.G.'s bonds by writing C.D.S.
contracts.

Given the huge size of the contracts and the number of parties
intertwined, the Federal Reserve decided that a default by A.I.G. would
wreak havoc on the financial system and cause contagious failures.
There was an immediate need to get A.I.G. the collateral to honor its
contracts, so the Fed loaned A.I.G. $85 billion.

Update:  Travis has an awesome post with his own FAQ about what is going on.  Here is a taste:

Lots of financially naive folks think that we can remove all risk,
inflation, etc. by only ever trading apples for chickens on the barrel
head, and doing away with paper money (so that all money is gold) and
doing away fractional reserve banking, so that when I deposit one gold
coin in the bank, the bank can then take that actual physical gold coin
and loan it to someone else. It turns out that the friction involved in
doing things this way is so huge that the effect would make The Road
Warrior look like a children's bedtime story. You want to borrow money
to buy a car? The bank can't just loan money that's been deposited in
someone else's checking account - the bank has to get that person to
sign a note saying "yes, I understand that this money is on deposit
until that dude buying the card pays the bank back IN FULL". And the
lender, if he wants his money out ahead of time, is SOL. And even then,
there can be a flood, and your car gets totaled, and you get
Legionaire's disease, and you can't make the payments.

or this:

Now, for the next complication, let's also imagine that there are
300 million other people watching all of this, thinking "How bad is
this? Should I go down to the gun store, stock up on .223 and 12 gauge
shells, then stop by the veterinarians to see how much antibiotics I
can cadge before heading to the hills" ?

And the Feds really don't want 300 million armed folks heading
for the national forests, so they first try to tell everyone who owns a
bicycle "Hey, the value of your bike didn't really drop! It's still
worth $9!".

But no one wants to believe that.

So then they go to the guy who's writing insurance policies on
the value of bikes and they say "if you got $100 million, would that
calm things down a bit?".

The other day I wrote to beware of rated capacity for wind and solar, because such plants tend to run way below their rated capacity on a 24-hour average.  MaxedOutMamma reads the wind report of the largest utility in Germany, which is as a country is among the largest adopters of wind power.  She finds this interesting bit:

As
wind power capacity rises, the lower availability of the wind farms
determines the reliability of the system as a whole to an ever
increasing extent. Consequently the greater reliability of traditional
power stations becomes increasingly eclipsed.

As
a result, the relative contribution of wind power to the guaranteed
capacity of our supply system up to the year 2020 will fall
continuously to around 4% (FIGURE 7). In concrete terms, this means
that in 2020, with a forecast wind power capacity of over 48,000MW
(Source: dena grid study), 2,000MW of traditional power production can
be replaced by these wind farms.

This is an even lower substitution factor than I mentioned previously, and is so because this report looks not just at the percent of time wind is blowing at full speed, but also at the peak load conventional power plants that must be kept running on standby due to the unreliability of wind.  At this 24:1 substitution ratio, folks like Al Gore and Boone Pickens will bankrupt us.  But of course, their investment portfolios, laden with alt-energy investments, will be paying off.

Over the weekend, I was reading an article about T. Boone Pickens' energy plan, a thinly disguised strategy to grab government subsidies for his wind investments.  And I started to think how amazing it is that electricity from wind has to be subsidized to compete with electricity from fossil fuels.  Here's what I mean:

• To get electricity from wind, one goes to a windy area, and puts up a big pole.  I presume that there are costs either in the land acquisition or in royalty payments to the land holder.  Either way, one then puts a generator on top of the pole, puts a big propeller on the generator, add some electrical widgets to get the right voltage and such, and hook it into the grid. 
   
• To get electricity from petroleum is a bit more complex.  First, it's not immediately obvious where the oil is.  It's hidden under the ground, and sometimes under a lot of ocean as well.  It takes a lot of technology and investment just to find likely spots where it might exist.  One must then negotiate expensive deals with often insanely unpredictable foreign governments for the right to produce the oil, and deal day to day with annoyances up to and including rebel attacks on one's facilities and outright nationalization once the investments have been made.  Then one must drill, often miles into the ground.  Offshore, huge, staggeringly expensive platforms must be erected -- many of which today can be taller than the worlds largest skyscrapers.  Further, these oil fields, once found, do not pump forever, and wells must be constantly worked over and in some cases have additional recovery modes (such as water flood) added. 

  The oil, once separated from gas and water, is piped and/or shipped hundreds or even thousands of miles to a refinery.  Refineries are enormously complex facilities, each representing billions of dollars of investment.  The oil must be heated up to nearly 1000 degrees and separated into its fractions  (e.g. propane, kerosene, etc.).  Each fraction is then desulpherized, and is often further processed (including cracking and reforming to make better gasoline).  These finished products are in turn shipped hundreds or thousands of miles by pipeline, barge, and truck to various customers and retail outlets.

  To make electricity from the oil, one then needs to build a large power plant, again an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars.  The oil is burned in huge furnaces that boil water, with the steam driving huge turbines that produce electricity.  This electricity must then go through some electrical widgets to get to the right voltage, and then is sent into the grid.

Incredibly, despite all this effort and technology and investment required to generate electricity from fossil fuels, wind generators still need subsidies to compete economically with them.  In a very real sense, the fact that fossil fuels can come to us even at today's prices is a modern day business and technological miracle.

Of course, in the press, the wind guys begging at the government trough are heroes, and the oil companies are villains. 

One of the most prevelent misconceptions about the political economy is the assumption that business universally opposes government licensing and regulation.  Often this misconception manifests itself as someone making a statement like, "Even [name of large competitor in the industry to be regulated] supports the proposed regulation so what are you libertarians complaining about."

In fact, regulation tends to protect incumbents at the expense of new entrants or new business models.  Large competitors can pass on the costs of regulation to customers, but new entrants have substantial investments to make just to build the systems and knowledge for compliance.  Perhaps worse, regulation like licensing tends to lock in current business models, by making current business practices part and parcel of becoming licensed.

For these reasons, I am excited by the book In Restraint of Trade by Butler Shaffer:

This extremely important study by Butler Shaffer--professor of law
and economist--will change the way you think of the relationship
between the state and business. It makes a deep inquiry into the
attitudes of business leaders toward competition during the years 1918
through 1938 to see how those attitudes were translated into proposals
for controlling competition, through political machinery under the
direction of trade associations.

What he finds is a business sector not only hostile to free markets
but aggressively in favor of restrictions that would protect their
interests. This, he finds, is the very source of the origins and
development of the regulatory state.

The author chooses this period because it was a time when the entire
relationship between American business and the federal government
underwent dramatic upheaval. It was in this time that business forged a
consensus about the scope and intensity of competition behavior that
they would tolerate. This began to exhibit a disposition favoring
collectivist authority over one another via government-backed
enforcement agencies.

Free and unrestrained competition required more of them than they
were willing to tolerate. It required constant innovation, a fight
against falling prices, a continued effort to seek out new markets, and
the willingness to subject their bottom line to consumer preferences
for lower prices and better products. They saw the vibrancy of free
enterprise as a threat to their firms and well being, so they used
anti-business sentiment in politics to hamper the market in ways that
would benefit them....

If you ever thought that the struggle for free enterprise was about
business versus government, this study, which is written in exciting
prose and beautiful English, will change the way you understand the
essential struggle. The evidence is vast that big business cooperated
closely with big government in building the essential architecture of
the mixed economy.

A number of readers have written me, the gist of the emails being "you have written that X or Y is NOT causing higher oil prices -- what do you think IS causing high oil prices?"  Well, OK, I will take my shot at answering that question.  Note that I have a pretty good understanding of economics but I am not a trained economist, so what follows relates to hard-core economics in the same way pseudo-code relates to C++.

My first thought, even before getting into oil, is that commodity prices can be volatile and go through boom-bust periods.  Here, for example, is a price chart of London copper since 1998:

While oil prices have gone up by a factor of about four since 1998, copper has gone up by a factor of about 15!  But the media seldom writes about it, because while individual consumers are affected by copper prices, they don't buy the commodity directly, and don't have stores on every street corner with the prices posted on the street.

For a number of years, it is my sense that oil demand has risen faster than supply capacity.  This demand has come from all over -- China gets a lot of the press, but even Europe has seen increases in gasoline use.  Throughout the world, we are on the cusp of something amazing happening - a billion or more people in Asia and South America are emerging from millennia of poverty.  This is good news, but wealthier people use more energy, and thus oil demand has increased.

On the supply side, my sense is that the market has handled demand growth up to a point because for years there was some excess capacity in the system.  The most visible is that OPEC often has been producing below their capacity, with Saudi Arabia as the historic swing producer.  But even in smaller fields in the US, there are always day to day decisions that can affect production and capacity on a micro scale.

One thing that needs to be understood - for any individual field, it is not always accurate to talk about its capacity or even its "reserves" as some fixed number.  How much oil that can be pumped out on any given day, and how much total oil can be pumped out over time, depend a LOT on prices.  For example, well production falls over time as conditions down in the bottom of the hole deteriorate  (think of it like a dredged river getting silted up, though this is a simplification).  Wells need to be reworked over time, or their production will fall.  Just the decision on the timing of this rework can affect capacity in the short term.  Then, of course, there are numerous investments that can be made to extend the life of the field, from water flood to CO2 flood to other more exotic things.  So new capacity can be added in small increments in existing fields.  A great example is the area around Casper, Wyoming, where fields were practically all shut-in in the 1990's with $20 oil but now is booming again.

At some point, though, this capacity is soaked up.  It is at this point that prices can shoot up very rapidly, particularly in a commodity where both supply and demand are relatively inelastic in the short term.

Let's hypothesize that gas prices were to double this afternoon at 3:00PM from $4 to $8.  What happens in the near and long-term to supply and demand?

In the near term, say in a matter of days, little will change on the demand side.  Everyone who drove to work yesterday will probably drive today in the same car -- they have not had time to shop for a new car or investigate bus schedules.  Every merchandise shipper will still be trucking their product as before - after all, there are orders and commitments in place.  People will still be flying - after all, they don't care about fuel prices, they locked their ticket price in months ago. 

However, people who argue that oil and gas demand is inelastic in the medium to long term are just flat wrong.  Already, we are seeing substantial reductions in driving miles in this country due to gas price increases.  Demand for energy saving investments, from Prius's to solar panels, is way up as well, demonstrating that prices are now high enough to drive not only changed behaviors but new investments in energy efficiency.  And while I don't have the data, I am positive that manufacturers around the world have energy efficiency investments prioritized much higher today in their capital budgets.

There are some things that slow this demand response.  Certain investments can just take a long time to play out.  For example, if one were to decide to move closer to work to cut down on driving miles, the process of selling a house and buying a new one is lengthy, and is complicated by softness in the housing markets.  There are also second tier capacity issues that come into play.  Suddenly, for example, lots more people want to buy a Prius, but Toyota only has so much Prius manufacturing capacity.  It will take time for this capacity to increase.  In the mean time, sales growth for these cars may be slower and prices may be higher.  Ditto solar panels. 

Also, there is an interesting issue that many consumers are not yet seeing the full price effects of higher oil and gas prices,and so do not yet have the price incentive to switch behavior.  One example is in air travel.  Airlines are hedged, at least this year, against much of the fuel price increase they have seen.  They are desperately trying not to drive people out of air travel (though DHS is doing its best) and so air fares have not fully reflected fuel price increases.  And since many people buy their tickets in advance, even a fare increase today would not affect flying volumes for a little while.

Another such example that is probably even more important are countries where consumers do not pay world market prices for gas and oil, with prices subsidized by the government (this is mostly true in oil producing countries, where the subsidy is not a cash subsidy but an opportunity cost in terms of lost revenue potential).  China is perhaps the most important example.  As we mentioned earlier, Chinese demand increases have been a large impact on world demand, as illustrated below:

All of these new consumers, though, are not paying the world market price for gasoline:

While consumers in much of the world have been reeling from spiraling
fuel costs, the Chinese government has kept the retail price of
gasoline at about $2.60 a gallon, up just 9% from January 2007.

During that same period, average gas prices in the U.S. have surged
nearly 80%, to about $4 a gallon. China's price control is great for
people like Tang, who drives long distances in his gas-guzzling Great
Wall sports utility vehicle.

But
Tang and millions of other Chinese are bracing for a big jump in pump
prices. The day of reckoning? Everybody believes it's coming right
after the Summer Olympics in Beijing conclude in late August.

Demand, of course, is going to appear inelastic to price increases if a large number of consumers are not having to pay the price increases.

Similarly, there are factors on the supply side that make response to large price increases relatively slow.  We've already discussed that there are numerous relatively quick investments that can be made to increase oil production from a field, but my sense is that most of these easy things have been done.  Further increases require development of whole new fields or major tertiary recovery investments in existing fields that take time.  Further, we run up against second order capacity issues much like we discussed above with the Prius's.  Currently, just about every offshore rig that could be used for development and exploration is being used, with a backlog of demand.  To some extent, the exploration and development business has to wait for the rig manufacturing business to catch up and increase the total rig capacity.

There are also, of course, structural issues limiting increases in oil supply.  In the west, increases in oil supply are at the mercy of governments that are schizophrenic.  They know their constituents are screaming about high oil prices, but they have committed themselves to CO2 reductions.  They know that their CO2 plans actually require higher, not lower, gas prices, but they don't want the public to understand that.  So they demagogue oil companies for high gas prices, while at the same time restricting increases in oil supply.  As a result, huge oil reserves in the US are off-limits to development, and both the US and Canada are putting up roadblocks to the development of our vast reserves of shale oil.

Outside of the west, most of the oil is controlled by government oil companies that are dominated by incompetence and corruption.  For years, companies like Pemex have been under-investing in their reserves, diverting cash out of the oil fields into social programs to prop up their governments.  The result is capacity that has not been well-developed and institutions that have only limited capability to ramp up the development of their reserves.

One of the questions I get asked a lot is, "Isn't there a good reason for suppliers to hold oil off the market to sustain higher prices?"  Well, let's think about that.

Let's begin with an analogy.  Why wouldn't Wal-mart start to hold certain items off the market to get higher prices?  Because they would be slaughtered, of course.  Many others would step in and fill the void, happy to sell folks whatever they need and taking market share from Wal-mart in the process.  I think we understand this better because we know the players and their motivations better in retail than we do in oil.  But the fact is that Wal-mart arguably has more market power, and in the US, more market share than any individual oil producer has worldwide.  Oil producers have seen boom and bust cycles in oil prices for over a hundred years.  They know from experience that $130 oil today may be $60 oil a year from now.  And thus holding one's oil off the market to try to sustain prices only serves to miss the opportunity to get $130 for one's oil for a while.  People tend to assume that the selfish play is to hold oil off the market to increase prices, but in fact it is just the opposite.  The player who takes this strategy reduces his/her own profit in order to help everyone else. 

This is a classic prisoner's dilemma game.  Let's consider for a moment that we are a large producer with some ability to move prices with our actions but still a minority of the market.  Consider a game with two players, us and everyone else.  Each player can produce 80% of their capacity or 100%.  A grid showing reasonable oil price outcomes from these strategies is shown below:

Reductions in our production from 100% to80% of capacity increases market prices, but not by as much as would reductions in production by other producers, who in total have more capacity than we.  Based on these prices, and assuming we have a million barrels a day of production capacity, the total revenue outcomes for us of these four combinations are shown below, in millions of dollars (in each case multiplying the price times 1 million barrels times the percent production of capacity, either 80 or 100%):

We don't know how other producers will behave, but we do know that whatever strategy they take, it is better for us to produce at 100%.  If we really could believe that everyone else will toe the line, then everyone at 80% is better for us than everyone at 100% -- but players do not toe the line, because their individual incentive is always to go to 100% production.  For smaller players who do not have enough volume to move the market individually (but who make up, in total, a lot of the total production) the incentive is even more dramatically skewed to producing the maximum amount.

The net result of all this is that forces are at work to bring down demand and bring supply up, they just take time.  I do think that at some point oil prices will fall back out of the hundreds.  Might this reckoning be pushed backwards a bit by bubble-type speculation?  Sure.  People have an incredible ability to assume that current conditions will last forever.  When oil prices were at $20 for a decade or so, people began acting like they would stay low forever.  With prices rising rapidly, people begin acting like they will continue rising forever.  Its an odd human trait, but a potentially lucrative one for contrarians who have the resources and cojones to bet against the masses and stick with their bet despite the fact that bubbles sometimes keep going up before they come back down.   

I don't have the economic tools to say if such bubble speculation is going on, or what a clearing price for oil might be once demand and supply adjustments really kick in.  I do have history as an imperfect guide.  In 1972 and later in 1978 we had some serious price shocks in oil:

Depending on if you date the last run-up in prices from '72 or '78, it took 5-10 years for supply and demand to sort themselves out (including the change in some structural factors, like US pricing regulations) before prices started falling.  We are currently about 6 years into the current oil price run-up, so I think it is reasonable to expect a correction in the next 2-3 years of fairly substantial magnitude. 

Postscript:  I have left out any discussion of the dollar, which has to play into this strongly, because what I understand about monetary policy and currencies wouldn't fill a thimble.  Suffice it to say that a fall in value of the dollar will certainly raise the price, to the US, of oil, but at the same time rising prices of imported oil tends to make the dollar weaker.  I don't know enough to sort out the chicken from the egg here,

Everyone has heard the knock on corporations -- they are supposedly short-term focused and incapable of making investments that don't pump up the current quarter.  We hear this in particular from government officials, right before they try to sell some egregious bit of pork-spending that is supposedly for "investment" in things these awful corporate guys won't invest in.

But of course the entire existence of the oil industry is proof-positive that this knock on large corporations can't be universally true, or else the oil industry would have gone out of business for lack of reserves some time in the late 19th century.  The oil industry routinely makes huge investments that take 10 years or more to even start to pay out (e.g. Alaska pipeline, shale oil, deep Gulf).  One major reason that supplies are currently tight is that most of the world's oil reserves are held by state companies (like Pemex) that are incapable of making the long-term investments their fields needs because there is so much pressure on the government to divert the oil profits into social programs rather than into renewing the reserve base.

And now look who is singing the same tune as Hugo Chavez and the other oil producing kleptocrats - Barack Obama:

"Opening our coastlines to offshore drilling would take at least a
decade to produce any oil at all, and the effect on gasoline prices
would be negligible at best since America only has 3 percent of the
world's oil," Obama said in a statement that did not explicitly
distinguish between oil and gas drilling."

Of course, offshore drilling was approved 10 years ago, but was vetoed by Bill Clinton.  I don't believe for a second that this is his real reason for opposing drilling (in fact, I believe him to be in the pocket of radical environmentalists and perfectly happy to demagogue oil companies for high prices rather than take responsibility for past government action).  However, if we take him at his word, this is an absolutely unbelievable lack of long-term focus from a man people like to call "visionary."

I agree with Kevin Drum, this is the dumbest thing I have read today:

There is a solution to the rising cost of oil, but it is a painful
one. Let's say there is a lot of $20-a-barrel oil in the world "”
deep-sea oil, Canadian tar sands. But who would look for $20-a-barrel
oil if someone else (Saudi Arabia) has lots of $5-a-barrel oil? The
answer is: no one.

Basically, American taxpayers have to guarantee potential producers
that the price in the future will not fall below $20 a barrel and that
they will not lose their investments.

This is easy to do. The U.S. needs to guarantee that it will buy all
of its oil at $20 a barrel before buying anything from OPEC. This
forces the price of oil down to $20 a barrel, but it eliminates the
possibility that it will ever go back to $5 a barrel.

The implication that no one will add capacity if there is anyone at all to the left of them on the supply curve is just silly, and defies history in any number of industries, including oil.  By this argument, no one would be building super-deep water oil platforms today.  The reason there is not more oil exploration today in certain areas of North America is that there are formal and informal government restrictions that make it hard and/or impossible.  And to the extent that oil companies are treating current oil prices as a bubble that will inevitably fall, all I can say is, bring it on. 

My son, an avid baseball player, loves the "field of dreams" concept, where little league fields are built to resemble famous major league stadiums.  We have played on such fields in several towns of California.  Recently, Gilbert, a suburb of Phoenix, ended up paying $40 million for such an 8-field complex, which seems excessive even with the cool concept.  It certainly is a whole new world when city governments build
little league baseball fields at the cost of $5 million per field.

As a private company in public recreation, I can say that the deal  cut by the city of Gilber with Big Leage Dreams to design, build, and operate the park really looks appalling.  We build and operate recreation facilities under competitively bid concession contracts, but never have I seen such a sweetheart deal.  First, in every case, I pay a bid percentage of revenues as rent to the public landlord for the concession.  This deal seems to include no such rent to be paid by the operator Big League Dreams.

Second, our company is always responsible for making at least some of the capital investments.  The public entity may have to lengthen the term or reduce the minimum rent to a level where a private company can get a return, but most of the capital nowadays is usually private.  Further, if the public entity does put up capital, it is a fixed amount with the private company responsible for the overage (if the private company is building it -- the terms might be different if the public entity is doing the construction itself).  In this case, the town of Gilbert let the private operator build the facility with little oversight and was committed to absorbing all of the 76% cost overrun.  Now the private company, who has already defaulted on its one major commitment to the city (ie the capital cost) gets a $40 million facility rent free to run for profit.  Stupid city.

Well, at least the city engaged an expert consultant to help them with the feasibility study, the project evaluation, and the writing of the bid spec.  That consultant was ... Big League Dreams.  The same company that by a wild coincidence also got the construction and operating contracts.

The New York Times editorial board had one of the most jaw-dropping pieces I have read in a long time.  In it, they are absolutely unapologetic in saying that they think the government can spend your money better than you can -- and the larger the government take, the happier we all will be.

The munificence of American corporate titans warms the heart, sort of.
The Chronicle of Philanthropy reports that the top 50 donors gave $7.3
billion to charity last year "” about $150 million per head....

Yet we'd be so much happier about all the good things America's
moneyed elite pay for if the government made needed public investments.

The flip side of American private largess is the stinginess of
the public sector. Philanthropic contributions in the United States "”
about $300 billion in 2006 "” probably exceed those of any other
country. By contrast, America's tax take is nearly the lowest in the
industrial world.

Oh my God, does anyone actually believe that Congress does a better job spending your money than you do?  Apparently they do:

Critics of government spending argue that America's private sector does
a better job making socially necessary investments. But it doesn't.
Public spending is allocated democratically among competing demands.
Rich benefactors can spend on anything they want, and they tend to
spend on projects close to their hearts.

LOLOLOL.  Has anyone looked at the last highway bill?  How many tens of thousands of politically motivated earmarks were there?   

Philanthropic contributions are usually tax-free. They directly reduce
the government's ability to engage in public spending. Perhaps the
government should demand a role in charities' allocation of resources
in exchange for the tax deduction. Or maybe the deduction should go
altogether. Experts estimate that tax breaks motivate 25 percent to 30
percent of contributions.

At the end of the day, this is not about a better prioritization process for spending -- this is about the NY Times getting a bigger say for itself in said spending.  They know that Warren Buffet couldn't give a rat's behind what the NY Times thinks about how he spends his money, but Congressmen trying to get reelected do care.  The NY Times wields a lot of political, but little private, influence, so they want to see as much spending as possible shift to political hands where the Times wields clout.

Postscript: Boy, here is some quality journalism:

Federal, state and local tax collections amount to just more than 25.5
percent of the nation's economic output. The Finnish government
collects 48.8 percent. As a result, the United States spends less on
social programs than virtually every other rich industrial country,
according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The Finnish government probably has money to build children's health
clinics.

"Probably has money?"  What does that mean?  Do they have government-funded children's health clinics or not?  The Times couldn't work up enough energy to fact-check that?  And by the way, who, other than the NY Times, declared that the best marginal use of additional public funds is for children's health clinics?

Postscript #2: Many of the very rich have been funding schools that are competitive with government-monopoly schools.  In this and many other cases, wealthy people fund programs that work better and cheaper than government alternatives.  I am sure that not only would the feds be happy to have this money to spend themselves (on some fat earmarks for key donors, most likely) but they would additionally be thrilled to get rid of the competition.

Update:  I must be going senile.  I missed the most obvious logical fallacy of all.  The NY Times says that our democratic government is the best possible mechanism for allocating funds.  But doesn't that also mean its the best possible mechanism for setting spending levels?  How can it complain that our democratic government is doing a bad job in setting total spending levels but does a great job in allocating that spending?

Here in Phoenix we have a sheriff named Joe Arpaio.  Sheriff Joe, as sensitive to building his media image as he is to fighting crime, has built himself a reputation among the majority of voters that he is a tough-on-crime code-of-the-west kind of guy.  As the Phoenix New Times describes his image:

While voters lapped up the sheriff's harsh approach to inmates in his
jails "” from forcing them to wear pink underwear, to feeding them
oxidized, green bologna, to working them in chain gangs, to housing
inmates in tents "” New Times
writers pointed out that the cruelty and violence in Arpaio's lockups
prompted Amnesty International's first investigation in America.

I, however, see Sheriff Joe as a shameless self-promoter, uncaring about basic civil rights, and a serial abuser of government power.  A number of Phoenix New Times (our free alt-weekly) reporters have been on Arpaio's ass for years, dogging him in the best tradition of American media trying to hold public officials accountable.

In 2004, during an election cycle, reporter John Dougherty found that Arpaio had over a million dollars of investments in commercial real estate parcels.  Dougherty asked the question, how does a lifetime public official making $78,000 a year have so much real estate?  Arpaio could have replied that his family was independently wealthy or that he had parlayed his real estate investment from rags to riches.  Instead, Arpaio used an obscure law aimed at protecting the home addresses of government officials to remove access to any public records of his commercial real estate transactions at the same time he removed his home address from these data bases.  Instead of explaining where the money came from, he used his power to cover his tracks.

The cool thing about alt-weeklies is that they are feisty in a way that major newspapers used to be but are no longer.  The paper responded by publishing Arpaio's home address in an editorial.  Ill-considered?  Perhaps, but the paper pointed to several public web site where Arpaio's home address was already published, including several government sites.  Their point:  Arpaio's concern about his home address was a smokescreen to mask the fact he was really trying to remove the records of his real estate investments.  If he had really been concerned about his home address being public, he would have removed it from all the other sites it appeared on, not just the data base he wished to purge of his commercial investments.  [update:  the law apparently bars publishing the address on the Internet, but not in other media.  The New Times is legally OK for publishing it in their print edition, but technically broke the law by having that print edition also appear on the web]

Joe Arpaio is never one to just "move on."  In response to the paper's editorial, Joe Arpaio used the full force of his public office to form a grand jury to investigate the Phoenix New Times.  Via the grand jury, his prosecutor-buddy has slapped a really amazing subpoena on this small newspaper.  This first part is bad enough:

In a breathtaking abuse of the United States Constitution, Sheriff Joe
Arpaio, Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas, and their increasingly
unhinged cat's paw, special prosecutor Dennis Wilenchik, used the grand
jury to subpoena "all documents related to articles and other content
published by Phoenix New Times newspaper in print and on the Phoenix
New Times website, regarding Sheriff Joe Arpaio from January 1, 2004 to
the present."

Pretty broad scope, huh?  If the case were really about whether the paper broke any laws by publishing his address, they would just subpoena that particular editorial.  But this case appears to be about a lot more, specifically a chance by Sheriff Joe to finally punish the New Times for years of critical reporting.  But the subpoena goes even further, into total la-la land:

The subpoena demands: "Any and all documents containing a compilation
of aggregate information about the Phoenix New Times Web site created
or prepared from January 1, 2004 to the present, including but not
limited to :

A) which pages visitors access or visit on the Phoenix New Times website;

                                       

B) the total number of visitors to the Phoenix New Times website;

                                       

C) information obtained from 'cookies,' including, but not limited to,
authentication, tracking, and maintaining specific information about
users (site preferences, contents of electronic shopping carts, etc.);

D) the Internet Protocol address of anyone that accesses the Phoenix New Times website from January 1, 2004 to the present;

                                       

E) the domain name of anyone that has accessed the Phoenix New Times website from January 1, 2004 to the present;

                                       

F) the website a user visited prior to coming to the Phoenix New Times website;

                                       

G) the date and time of a visit by a user to the Phoenix New Times website;

                                       

H) the type of browser used by each visitor (Internet Explorer,
Mozilla, Netscape Navigator, Firefox, etc.) to the Phoenix New Times
website; and

I) the type of operating system used by each visitor to the Phoenix New Times website."

I am sorry to do this to you, but if you clicked through to the Phoenix New Times site via the links in this story, any personal information that is recoverable about you is now subject to this subpoena. 

For years I have argued against special privileges like shield laws for the press.  My point has always been that we should not create a special class of citizen with more or less rights.  And this case does not change my mind, for this reason:  We all should have protection against this kind of abusive and intrusive probing by a public official, not just the press.  The Phoenix New Times should not have to divulge the details of its readership, but neither should my blog or Jane Doe's MySpace page.  This kind of prosecutorial fishing expedition against a critic of a government official is not wrong because it is directed at the press; it is wrong because it is directed at any American.

Update:  I didn't get into all the really weird stuff.  For example, Joe Arpaio argued that publication of his home address was damaging because groups were out to assassinate him:

A Mexican drug cartel acting on behalf of the Minutemen through the
intercession of a pro-immigration rights radio talk show host intended
to assassinate Arpaio, according to a sheriff's office investigation
detailed on the front page of the Sunday, October 7, edition of the Arizona Republic.

                                       

Now just think about this for a second. The Minutemen hate Mexicans
sneaking across the border. They are even less fond if the Mexicans are
smuggling drugs.

And we are supposed to believe that the Minutemen, seldom associated
with unexplained stashes of bling, agreed to a $3 million assassination
fee and put 50 percent down?

And that this was brokered by Elias Bermudez, a talk radio host, former
mayor of Mexican border town San Luis Rio Colorado in Sonora, and an
outspoken critic of Sheriff Arpaio "” and, obviously, no fan of the
Minutemen?

And a key linchpin in this comic book farce was a teenage girl in a
prep school in Hartford, Connecticut, who was an exchange student at
one point in San Luis. If the drug cartel needed to contact the
Minutemen "for any reason," they could use a particular e-mail address
. . . which, as the officers discovered, belonged to a kid in a private
school.

And from the Arizona Republic, our mainstream paper that usually fawns over Arpaio:

The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office spent an estimated $500,000
during the past six months protecting Joe Arpaio from an assassination
that supposedly was designed to cause a furor in the United States over
illegal immigration.

The convoluted plot, reported to police by a paid informant,
purportedly involved members of the Minuteman border group hiring a hit
squad from a Mexican drug cartel and using an outspoken
immigrant-rights advocate as their intermediary.

Sheriff's officials now acknowledge that virtually none of the information supplied by the source panned out.

I'm sorry, but the person who dreams this stuff up has a huge burden of proof to even argue that he is sane, much less should be our sheriff.  The Minutemen love Sheriff Joe -- they are peas in a pod.  They believe many of the same things.  The odds they would be trying to assassinate him are ZERO.  By the way, this is not the first time Arpaio dreamed up an assassination plot:

in 2003 ... prosecutors took hapless James Saville to trial for
"plotting" to kill Arpaio. Jurors wound up deciding that deputies set
up the assassin, coaxing and entrapping him. Saville was acquitted ("The Plot to Assassinate Arpaio," August 5, 1999).

                                     
Then there was the time Arpaio identified a threat upon his life that
turned out to be an art student's sculpture of a spider left upon his
lawn.

Update:  Joe Arpaio has arrested the owners of the Phoenix New Times paper for revealing the contents of the subpoena.

The long drain begins:

When Kathleen Casey-Kirschling signs up for
Social Security benefits Monday, it will represent one small step for
her, one giant leap for her baby boom generation "” and a symbolic jump
toward the retirement system's looming bankruptcy.

Casey-Kirschling "” generally recognized as the
nation's first boomer (born in Philadelphia on Jan. 1, 1946, at
12:00:01 a.m.) "” won't bankrupt the Social Security system by taking
early retirement at 62. But after her, the deluge: 80 million Americans
born from 1946 to 1964 who could qualify for Social Security and
Medicare during the next 22 years.

The first wave of 3.2 million baby boomers turns
62 next year "” 365 an hour. About 49% of the men and 53% of the women
are projected to choose early retirement and begin drawing monthly
Social Security checks representing 75% of the benefit they'd be
entitled to receive if they waited four more years to retire.

If Social Security were a well-managed private insurance program, this would be a non-event.  The returns on investments over the last 40 years have been tremendous, such that a private fund could easily start paying out benefits based on boomers' premiums.

Unfortunately, as a government program, the funds in the program are subject to the whims of politicians.  And it turns out that boomers have elected politicians who have spent all the money that has been contributed to Social Security (despite USA Today in their graphics trying to continue the myth that a meaningful "trust fund" actually exists as anything but a bunch of government IOU's to itself.)  So, because Congress has spent all the past contributions, an action that would have had any private manager jailed decades ago, Social Security must now run itself as a Ponzi scheme, where current contributions pay off retiree benefits.  This game runs out somewhere in the 2020's.  And this all despite the fact that Social Security pays out a negative rate of return.

I haven't had much to say about mortgage markets, mainly because what is going on is so obvious and straight-forward I wouldn't have thought it needed comment.  Even smart financial people get caught up in speculative bubbles, as was demonstrated in the late 1990's when they put money into some really dumb Internet investments.  New credit products can be difficult to price, since much of the costs come after the initial sales are made (in the form of defaults).  So some companies mispriced a new product, some others got caught up in a speculative bubble, same-old same-old.  This too will pass ... unless of course the government does something really stupid like bail some of these guys out, and then it will happen over and over again because no one will have an incentive to change their behavior.

I am afraid I also don't have tons of sympathy for the borrowers.  By definition, since most of these subprime loans were little or nothing down, folks are not losing their life-savings and equity, because they didn't have any equity.  They are being forced to move out of their house in the same way a tenant might if he couldn't make his rent payments, except in this case the "rent" was tax-deductable.  I do feel some sympathy for consumer borrowers who were enticed into borrowing against their home rather than through some sort of consumer loan, thus endangering their house to buy that big screen TV.  But who did the enticing - wasn't it the government, who provides a huge subsidy for home equity lending (via the mortgage interest deductibility on income taxes) versus other forms of borrowing?

But here is the amazing thing to me:  the same politicians who demagogue payday loan companies for providing loans that are too expensive can simultaneously demagogue subprime lenders for loans that were too cheap.  They criticize the same banks now for being too free with credit to the poor that they have criticized for years (via redlining suits and such) for being too stingy with credit to the poor. 

It's almost as if politicians don't really care what lenders are doing, they just want to find an excuse to get a few sound-bites on the local news back in their district and issue some legislation to expand federal power in the banking industry.

Previously, I posted how my book BMOC foresaw a new business model in giving product placements to the most popular high school kids as opinion leaders who would drive adoption by their fellow teens.

This week, TJIC points out that the New York Times is starting to sniff around another business model in the book, that of fountain coin harvesting.  They are starting to see the market:

In all these babbling places, the story is the same: Coins pile up, Mr.
Mendez removes them and people's fascination with tossing pocket change
into water continues, unexplained"¦

But miss the real business model (from the book):

On
the basis of this market research and his quirky insight, Preston Marsh founded
3Coins, Inc, and began an intensive six month research and development
program. He hired engineers from several
hot tub and spa companies that had developed the modular spa, a design where
all the necessary pumps and plumbing were integrated with the tub into a single
portable unit. His designers worked long
weeks coming up with three modular fountain designs, driving down the estimated
manufacturing cost to just $350 per unit. 

Next,
Preston Marsh took these fountain designs to mall owners, architects, building
managers, landscapers and anyone who designed or owned public spaces. In every case, the deal was the same: Preston Marsh would give the client one or
more free fountains to adorn their public spaces, and would even provide the
labor to clean and treat the fountains once a week. In return, Preston Marsh literally "kept the
change". Preston Marsh paid local
entrepreneurs 25% of the change drop to clean the fountains and empty and
deposit the change. The rest was pure
profit.

The
resulting economics were startling. For
each installation, Preston Marsh had up-front investments of about $750,
including the $350 tub plus delivery and installation. In return, Preston Marsh gained about $50 a
week in revenue, or $37.50 after the servicing agent took his 25%. Over a year, the fountain would produce
$1,950 in revenue, with virtually no expenses or overhead. 

After
five years, 3Coins had nearly 10,000 fountains in place, generating almost $20
million in annual revenue, over half of which was profit. And Preston Marsh owned 100% of the company.

You can still buy BMOC at Amazon, which has had a bit of a sales resurgence of late after a couple of press mentions.   Servers are standing by.

Previously, I posted how my book BMOC foresaw a new business model in giving product placements to the most popular high school kids as opinion leaders who would drive adoption by their fellow teens.

This week, TJIC points out that the New York Times is starting to sniff around another business model in the book, that of fountain coin harvesting.  They are starting to see the market:

In all these babbling places, the story is the same: Coins pile up, Mr.
Mendez removes them and people's fascination with tossing pocket change
into water continues, unexplained"¦

But miss the real business model (from the book):

On
the basis of this market research and his quirky insight, Preston Marsh founded
3Coins, Inc, and began an intensive six month research and development
program. He hired engineers from several
hot tub and spa companies that had developed the modular spa, a design where
all the necessary pumps and plumbing were integrated with the tub into a single
portable unit. His designers worked long
weeks coming up with three modular fountain designs, driving down the estimated
manufacturing cost to just $350 per unit. 

Next,
Preston Marsh took these fountain designs to mall owners, architects, building
managers, landscapers and anyone who designed or owned public spaces. In every case, the deal was the same: Preston Marsh would give the client one or
more free fountains to adorn their public spaces, and would even provide the
labor to clean and treat the fountains once a week. In return, Preston Marsh literally "kept the
change". Preston Marsh paid local
entrepreneurs 25% of the change drop to clean the fountains and empty and
deposit the change. The rest was pure
profit.

The
resulting economics were startling. For
each installation, Preston Marsh had up-front investments of about $750,
including the $350 tub plus delivery and installation. In return, Preston Marsh gained about $50 a
week in revenue, or $37.50 after the servicing agent took his 25%. Over a year, the fountain would produce
$1,950 in revenue, with virtually no expenses or overhead. 

After
five years, 3Coins had nearly 10,000 fountains in place, generating almost $20
million in annual revenue, over half of which was profit. And Preston Marsh owned 100% of the company.

You can still buy BMOC at Amazon, which has had a bit of a sales resurgence of late after a couple of press mentions.   Servers are standing by.

Today, the price of gasoline at the pump before taxes is about $2.50 a gallon.  The price of milk per gallon is about $3.50 a gallon, and may rise to $5.00 by the fall. 

So I will present you with a heresy:  Gasoline is an absolutely screaming deal.  Having worked a brief stint in the oil industry, it is incredible what has to happen and the investments that are in place to get gas into your car.  Offshore oil platforms, dealing with unstable governments, thousand mile long pipelines, fleets of supertankers, huge complex refineries, and massive distribution networks are required to get gas to your car.  And yet, it's a buck cheaper than milk, which in comparison is nearly trivial to produce.  Sure, the milk needs a little processing and transportation, but compare this to oil, where processing involves reforming the very molecules in the oil to perfect the gas, and where transportation is across distances one to two orders of magnitude greater than for milk.  And don't even get me started on production:  a) cow  b) offshore oil platform in 1000 foot deep water.

It is perhaps even more instructive to see how the government regulates these two commodities.  Oil companies are constantly harassed by government as the world's great Satans, with windfall profits taxes and price gouging regulations, all on an industry that barely makes a 10% profit on sales in the best of times.  Milk, on the other hand, gets huge government subsidies and handouts, including a price support system that is both arcane and incredibly costly.  So Oil:  windfall profits taxes.  Milk, which is pricier but easier to produce: price supports.  Does anyone really want to argue that regulation is a result of real market realities rather than just populist pandering for and against favored and unfavored groups?

A few days ago, I was astounded to find that oil prices had a here-to-for unsuspected (at least by Congress) utility - that they can actually manage demand to help match supply.  But this strange phenomenon is even more amazing, because it now appears that higher oil prices also have the ability to stimulate investments in increasing production of this scarce commodity:

The American oil patch, once left to languish during an extended
period of low oil prices, is on the rebound. Wildcatters like Mr.
Bryant are ready to pounce. With oil prices now hovering around $60 a
barrel "” three times higher than they were throughout the 1990s "” the
industry is expanding at a pace last seen decades ago.

"The oil
industry has changed dramatically in the last 20 years," Mr. Bryant
says. "Barriers to entry have dropped significantly. It doesn't matter
if you've been in the business 100 years or 100 days."

Easily
available capital and technology, once the preserve of traditional oil
companies, are reordering the business. Investors are lining up to
finance energy projects while leaps in computing power, imaging
technology and collaborative online networks now allow the smallest
entities to compete on an equal footing with the biggest players.

"There's
a lot of money out there looking for opportunities," said John
Schaeffer, the head of the oil and gas unit at GE Energy Financial
Services. "It seems like everyone wants to own an oil well now."

Advice to Nancy Pelosi and Maria Cantwell:  You may need to study this phenomenon.

Don Boudreaux has a post I would call "How I stopped worrying and learned to love foreign ownership of US assets."  He's the economist, so I refer you to him for the real arguments.  I just want to offer this thought experiment.  Consider two countries.  In the first country, call it Venezuela, US individuals and companies have billions of dollars of investments in Venezuelan assets, with little Venezuelan capital invested reciprocally in the US.  In the other country, call it China, the Chinese government and other private groups hold billions, perhaps trillions of US dollar denominated securities and US domestic hard assets. 

Which country has more power over us?  Is it China, who could suddenly try to sell our assets back to us at cut rate prices, thereby, uh, taking a huge financial loss for themselves to temporarily roil our markets.  Or is it Venezuela, who can (and has) simply seized all the assets in their country owned by Americans and repudiated its debts?

Not clear enough?  OK, lets go back to the cold war.  Let's say the USSR had lent our government a trillion dollars or so, thereby holding lots of dollar denominated US government debt.  Let's say they also made massive investments in US land and buildings.  Would we have said, "boy, they have us now?"  No.  I mean, hell no!  We'd have their money, they'd just hold our paper.  If the Russki's got adventurous in Afghanistan, we could just say, sorry, we are going to stop paying on all those bonds you hold until you get out.  This situation is so clear that in fact it was the USSR's strategy to do just the opposite, ie to borrow as much as possible from the west, taking western money to fund their economy while creating a threat of loan default they could use strategically.  American hawks argued that it was insane to lend to the USSR, because this gave them leverage over us. 

The notion that China holding billions of American government and corporate paper gives them a substantial power imbalance over us is just silly.  Granted it makes conflict expensive for both us and the Chinese, just as all trade and global private interaction does.  Which is a good thing.