Regulation Protects Industry Incombents
I often see folks who are arguing for increased government regulation of some industry observe that "even those greedy corporations in this industry support this new regulation." For example, if a power company takes a public position to support greenhouse gas emissions, then that is used as evidence that such regulation must really be necessary if even the to-be-regulated are in favor. Greg Craven makes such an argument in his global warming video that I refuted the other day.
There are two very good reasons a company in such a position might publicly support even a bad regulation. The first is basic politics and PR: If the regulation appears inevitable and has public support, then it is sometimes better to get out ahead of it and try to curry favor with politicians and the public to manage the regulation's implementation. We all know corporations give donations to political candidates, but look at how they give them. Corporate donations correlate far better with "who is expected to win" rather than "who would create the most favorable regulatory environment for the corporation." In fact, corporations are highly likely to give donations to both candidates in a closely-fought election, and a lot of their giving is after the election, to the winner of course.
The other good reason that companies support regulation in their industry is because a lot of regulation is either designed to, or effectively, helps incumbent companies against new entrants. I have talked about this many times with the questioning of licensing. Global warming regulation and carbon trading systems in particular give us another great example:
BBC News understands the industry will be allowed to increase emissions
as much as it wants by the European environment council. Aviation is
the fastest growing source of greenhouse gases. But Europe's
environment ministers look set to reject a plan for a strict cap on
emissions from planes. Instead, airlines will be given a set number of
permits to pollute.Instead, airlines will be given a set number of permits to pollute.
If
they overshoot their limit they will be allowed to buy spare permits
from firms who have managed to cut emissions elsewhere - manufacturing
industry, for instance.
So, current airlines in Europe will be given carbon permits that presumable support their current business level. However, any new entrant, or any current player wishing to take market share from another airline, must spend money on carbon credits to grab this market share, carbon credits the current established incumbents got for free. This in effect becomes a tax on market share gains. This European-style protection of large corporations is typical, and is why the 30 largest companies in Europe are nearly the same as they were in 1965, but are completely different in the US.
This is also why, though I don't think expensive action on CO2 is justified, I think that if we do so the approach must be a carbon tax rather than cap and trade. But cap and trade has so much potential for political hijinx and giving special deals to the politically influential that my guess is that politicians will want cap and trade.
