Coyote Blog

Overlawyered today provides a link to this article in Roger Parloff's blog at Fortune

The nation's leading class-action lawyer, Bill Lerach, is currently in
an ugly scrape in federal court in Dallas, where the sole lead
plaintiff in a high-profile shareholder suit against Halliburton (HAL)
no longer wants Lerach or his firm to act as its co-lead counsel. (I've
posted about it before here and here.)
To recap, the fund has said that it is concerned about all the
distractions and the sleaze factor now surrounding Lerach and his prior
firm, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (which Lerach co-ran)...

The squeamish plaintiff, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Supporting Fund, has asked that Lerach Coughlin be replaced by David
Boies and his firm, Boies Schiller & Flexner, which firm has
indicated that it is ready, willing, and able to assume the role.

Needless to say, Lerach is fighting the uppity plaintiff to keep control of the case.

Parloff goes on to question some of Lerach's statements in the case.  However, I want to make a different point.  This points out fairly clearly that Lerach and other top litigators have adopted a whole new theory of litigation and of the relationship between lawyer and client.

It used to be that clients would suffer some sort of injury and seek redress in the courts.  To do so, they would hire an attorney to help them.  The attorney was the hired help, compensated either hourly or via a percentage of any awards.

Today, the situation is often reversed.  It is the attorney who is identifying lawsuit targets for class actions and shareholder suits, and then seeking out clients who can maximize his chances of success.  Clients, who typically make orders of magnitude less than the attorney in class actions (think 50-cent coupons and $8 million attorney fees) are selected because they are sympathetic, or give access to a particularly plaintiff-attractive jurisdiction, or, in cases such as ADA suits in California, because they have effectively become partners with the attorney in serial torts.

So if you wonder why Lerach is suing his client for not using his services, and if that makes you wonder who is working for whom, now you know.

Update: By the way, this reversal of the relationship between attorney and client is one of the recurring themes in my novel BMOC.

Last week, Milberg-Weiss and two of its partners were formally charged with bribery and fraud surround their aggressive pursuit of class-action lawsuits, often against companies with falling share prices.  Walter Olson helps describe in detail what was going on, but the short answer is that the firm, as many of us suspected for years, appears to have been generating class action suits against large companies mainly for the benefit of itself and the legal fees generated.  A few months ago, I questioned shareholder suits and their fundamental logic when I was guestblogging at Overlawyered.

So I am happy that this particular rock is finally being turned over.  However, there are substantial problems on the prosecution side of this as well.  The Justice department is using the abusive Thompson Memo guidelines to go after Milberg-Weiss.  Larry Ribstein is concerned with the firm death penalty approach being taken here that was used to bring down Arthur Anderson.

Milberg is a different story. The case seems to be based on the
alleged misconduct of a couple of partners. If the partners did what
they are accused of, they should go down. Moreover, the firm will have
earned fees under questionable circumstances and should bear civil
consequences for that. But the criminal indictment casts a shadow on
the entire firm that it will have a hard time surviving, given the need
to establish its credibility for courts and institutional investors in
the highly competitive class action industry. Moreover, unlike AA, it's
not clear the indictment reveals a continuing public policy problem,
given the post-PSLRA reliance on unbribable plaintiffs.

We (and I) may not like Milberg's business. But the class action
part of it was one enabled by legal rules. The right way to deal with
the problems of this business is to change the rules, as I've argued
for securities class actions in my Fraud on a Noisy Market.
When we criminally condemn firms like Milberg because we don't like
their business, we set a precedent for other firms in controversial
lines of work -- e.g., Drexel Burnham.

More seriously, the power to criminalize a firm puts a potent tool
in the government's hands to get the firm to cooperate in sacrificing
the rights of criminal defendants. Here the cure seems patently worse
the disease. The questions are no less in Milberg than in KPMG just
because Milberg was in an unpopular line of work.

The government tactic de jour, as outlined in the Thompson memo, is to threaten a large company with extinction, telling them they might get off the hook but only if they agree to throw a number of their employees to the wolves.  These steps include the unbelievable step of forcing companies to waive attorney client privilege, including privilege between any company-paid attorney and any employee.  Does anyone doubt that if the company who employs you was given the choice of having the government prosecute them or you, who they would choose?  In this context, Arthur Anderson should be commended for not sacrificing its employees for its own survival.  KPMG survived, because it chose to roll over on its employees.  I commented on many of the problems with the AA takedown here, and on the dangers of the Thompson Memo here and here.  Tom Kirkendall is all over the story.