Coyote Blog

I am way, way late in posting this, but there was good news several weeks ago when a judged slapped down federal prosecutors in the KPMG case for essentially following the Thompson Memo and dismissed all charges in the case.  Here was the initial confrontation the judge had with prosecutors over a year ago, which explains key provisions of the Thompson memo:

Those steps were extraordinary in their attempt to
pressure corporate executives: They include waiving attorney-client
privilege to give investigators access to internal documents and
cutting off accused employees from legal and other forms of support. In
short, the Thompson memo said that companies under investigation are
expected to surrender any right against self-incrimination and cut
their accused employees adrift.

In one sense, the memo's guidelines are just that --
internal guidelines for prosecutors. But as a practical matter, only a
rare CEO will risk the death sentence that a corporate indictment
represents. So "cooperation" as defined by Justice is hardly optional.
It was on this point that Judge Kaplan took Assistant U.S. Attorney
Justin Weddle to task last week. When Judge Kaplan questioned the
fairness of pressuring companies to throw their employees overboard,
Mr. Weddle replied that companies are "free to say, 'We're not going to
cooperate.'"

"That's lame," the judge retorted. He then asked Mr.
Weddle "what legitimate purpose" was served by insisting that companies
cut their former employees off from legal support. Companies under
investigation, Judge Kaplan noted, ought to be free to decide whether
to support their employees or former employees without Justice's "thumb
on the scale."

Mr. Weddle replied that paying the legal fees of
former employees charged with crimes amounted to protecting
"wrongdoers." This prompted the judge to remind the young prosecutor
that the accused are still innocent until proven guilty. He also
reminded Mr. Weddle that the Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees
the right to counsel. And for good measure, if the government is
confident in its case, it shouldn't be afraid to allow "wrongdoers"
access to an adequate defense.

And this is from his decision to drop all charges:

Just as prosecutors used KPMG to coerce interviews with KPMG personnel
that the government could not coerce directly, they used KPMG to strip
any of its employees who were indicted of means of defending themselves
that KPMG otherwise would have provided to them. Their actions were not
justified by any legitimate governmental interest. Their deliberate
interference with the defendants' rights was outrageous and shocking in
the constitutional sense
because it was fundamentally at odds with two of our most basic
constitutional values "“ the right to counsel and the right to fair
criminal proceedings. But the Court does not rest on this finding
alone. It would reach the same conclusion even if the conduct reflected
only deliberate indifference to the defendants' constitutional rights
as opposed to an unjustified intention to injure them.

Tom Kirkendall has more analysis

I know that no one seems to really give a crap about due process for accountants nowadays, perhaps an over-swing of the pendulum from the days when no one really cared much about prosecuting white collar crime, but some of the Justice Departments prosecutorial abuses are finally coming back to haunt them.

The Justice Department's case against 16 former KPMG partners for tax
evasion continues to unravel, with prosecutors themselves conceding
late last week that federal Judge Lewis Kaplan has little choice but to
dismiss the charges against most of the defendants.

Judge Kaplan ruled
last year that Justice had violated the defendants' Constitutional
rights by pressuring KPMG not to pay their legal fees. He is now
considering a defense motion to dismiss. Prosecutors continue to
protest the judge's ruling but on Friday they admitted in a court
filing that dismissal is the only remedy for the rights violations. The
more honorable route would have been for prosecutors to acknowledge
their mistakes and dismiss the charges themselves.

The truth is that
this tax shelter case should never have been brought. Both KPMG and its
partners believed the shelters they marketed were legal, and no tax
court had ruled against the shelters before Justice brought its
criminal charges. Then prosecutors used the threat of criminal
indictment against all of KPMG to extort an admission of guilt from the
firm and force it to stop paying the legal bills of individual partners.

Last week, Milberg-Weiss and two of its partners were formally charged with bribery and fraud surround their aggressive pursuit of class-action lawsuits, often against companies with falling share prices.  Walter Olson helps describe in detail what was going on, but the short answer is that the firm, as many of us suspected for years, appears to have been generating class action suits against large companies mainly for the benefit of itself and the legal fees generated.  A few months ago, I questioned shareholder suits and their fundamental logic when I was guestblogging at Overlawyered.

So I am happy that this particular rock is finally being turned over.  However, there are substantial problems on the prosecution side of this as well.  The Justice department is using the abusive Thompson Memo guidelines to go after Milberg-Weiss.  Larry Ribstein is concerned with the firm death penalty approach being taken here that was used to bring down Arthur Anderson.

Milberg is a different story. The case seems to be based on the
alleged misconduct of a couple of partners. If the partners did what
they are accused of, they should go down. Moreover, the firm will have
earned fees under questionable circumstances and should bear civil
consequences for that. But the criminal indictment casts a shadow on
the entire firm that it will have a hard time surviving, given the need
to establish its credibility for courts and institutional investors in
the highly competitive class action industry. Moreover, unlike AA, it's
not clear the indictment reveals a continuing public policy problem,
given the post-PSLRA reliance on unbribable plaintiffs.

We (and I) may not like Milberg's business. But the class action
part of it was one enabled by legal rules. The right way to deal with
the problems of this business is to change the rules, as I've argued
for securities class actions in my Fraud on a Noisy Market.
When we criminally condemn firms like Milberg because we don't like
their business, we set a precedent for other firms in controversial
lines of work -- e.g., Drexel Burnham.

More seriously, the power to criminalize a firm puts a potent tool
in the government's hands to get the firm to cooperate in sacrificing
the rights of criminal defendants. Here the cure seems patently worse
the disease. The questions are no less in Milberg than in KPMG just
because Milberg was in an unpopular line of work.

The government tactic de jour, as outlined in the Thompson memo, is to threaten a large company with extinction, telling them they might get off the hook but only if they agree to throw a number of their employees to the wolves.  These steps include the unbelievable step of forcing companies to waive attorney client privilege, including privilege between any company-paid attorney and any employee.  Does anyone doubt that if the company who employs you was given the choice of having the government prosecute them or you, who they would choose?  In this context, Arthur Anderson should be commended for not sacrificing its employees for its own survival.  KPMG survived, because it chose to roll over on its employees.  I commented on many of the problems with the AA takedown here, and on the dangers of the Thompson Memo here and here.  Tom Kirkendall is all over the story.

I have written several times on prosecutorial abuse, most recently in this post on the Justice Department's current practice of forcing companies to waive attorney-client privilege and punishing companies that help their employees seek legal council.

The WSJ($) editorializes about a recent division by Judge Lewis Kaplan in the KPMG trial.

Those steps were extraordinary in their attempt to
pressure corporate executives: They include waiving attorney-client
privilege to give investigators access to internal documents and
cutting off accused employees from legal and other forms of support. In
short, the Thompson memo said that companies under investigation are
expected to surrender any right against self-incrimination and cut
their accused employees adrift.

In one sense, the memo's guidelines are just that --
internal guidelines for prosecutors. But as a practical matter, only a
rare CEO will risk the death sentence that a corporate indictment
represents. So "cooperation" as defined by Justice is hardly optional.
It was on this point that Judge Kaplan took Assistant U.S. Attorney
Justin Weddle to task last week. When Judge Kaplan questioned the
fairness of pressuring companies to throw their employees overboard,
Mr. Weddle replied that companies are "free to say, 'We're not going to
cooperate.'"

"That's lame," the judge retorted. He then asked Mr.
Weddle "what legitimate purpose" was served by insisting that companies
cut their former employees off from legal support. Companies under
investigation, Judge Kaplan noted, ought to be free to decide whether
to support their employees or former employees without Justice's "thumb
on the scale."

Mr. Weddle replied that paying the legal fees of
former employees charged with crimes amounted to protecting
"wrongdoers." This prompted the judge to remind the young prosecutor
that the accused are still innocent until proven guilty. He also
reminded Mr. Weddle that the Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees
the right to counsel. And for good measure, if the government is
confident in its case, it shouldn't be afraid to allow "wrongdoers"
access to an adequate defense.

Its good to see these practices starting to get some judicial scrutiny.  There is unfortunately no real political constituency in this country to get worked up about this kind of stuff.  Left-leaning groups tend to be the first to challenge police and prosecutorial abuses of power, but have little interest in doing so when the target (ie corporations) is someone they have no ideological sympathy for.  And right-leaning groups tend to be strong law-and-order types that feel the need to go out of their way to be tough on recent corporate transgressors to avoid the accusation that they are in bed politically with white collar criminals.

The firm of Arthur Anderson was put to death by government prosecutors.  Unlike human beings, Anderson was killed without ever receiving a trial, and was dead long before any appeal was mounted.  Many a media tear have been shed for Enron employees who lost their savings in the Enron 401-K, where they invested in Enron by choice, but I have seen few people sympathizing with the tens of thousands of people who lost their savings in the AA collapse, the vast vast majority of whom never touched the Enron account.

Mary Morrison has a nice analysis (pdf) of why Anderson was probably killed unfairly.  Her central argument is that the main fraud at Enron was perpetrated in the off-balance sheet special purpose entities, or SPE's, when third parties put up capital that the SPE called equity, but was in fact really a loan with a verbal (non-written) promise to repay by either the entity or Enron.  By disguising a loan as equity, and by by disgusing related parties as arms-length investors, Enron was able to avoid consolidation of the SPE's with its financial statements.

Ms. Morrison argues persuasively that since Anderson was not the auditor for any of these SPEs, it had no way to uncover the true nature of these sham financing agreements, since these SPEs were effectively different corporations with different auditors.  AA had to rely on signed statements by each deal's principals that the financing for the SPE was as described (which is standard practice in this type situation and is considered to represent adequate due dilligence).  Anderson had no way to know what was going on in the SPE's, and since the SPE's were separate legal entities from Enron, it had no legal right to poke around in these entities and of course no subpoena power.  It had no way to know about the hidden verbal second part of the financing agreements.  She argues AA was a victim of the fraud and of false statements by Enron and the SPE managers and investors. 

It is interesting to note that the prosecution of the Enron case is prosecuting Enron managers right at this minute for making such fraudulent statements to AA and for hiding the nature of the SPE's from AA.  In other words, the prosecution team that first gave AA the death penalty for allegedly conspiring with Enron to hide their problems is now prosecuting Enron managers on the legal theory that AA was innocent and duped by the managers, which was AA's defense before they were wiped out.

Tom Kirkendall has more on AA's martyrdom here.  He also continues his scary series of articles on prosecutorial abuse here.  The pressure brought to bear to prevent defense witnesses from testifying is particularly frightening.  When you read this, you are really left wondering how the auditors for the SPE's, which may include KPMG, escaped unscathed (in fact escaped richer, since they got their share of the now-defunct Anderson's clients) when Anderson was put to death.